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TOWARDS A NEW GENERATION
IN CENTRAL AMERICAN TRADE:
PROPOSALS FOR MODERNIZING
CAFTA-DR
Julia E. Johnson
“Free trade, far from protectionism, is the path that we
should take to make Latin America a thriving actor in the global
economy.” – Enrique Pena Nieto
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INTRODUCTION
To the surprise of many, the Trump Administration has
signaled its intent to renegotiate the Dominican RepublicCentral America Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR).1 Why is
the possible renegotiation of CAFTA-DR a surprise? CAFTA-DR
has been largely favorable to the United States (U.S.)—the U.S.
has enjoyed significant trade surpluses with CAFTA-DR
countries since its ratification.2 CAFTA-DR has also promoted
regional integration and co-production in Central America.3
Trade flows in and out of Central America have increased
significantly.4 On balance, CAFTA-DR has benefitted all
signatory nations from a trade standpoint, though it has left
unaddressed a myriad of social, humanitarian, and governance
issues. Consequently, as CAFTA-DR is renegotiated, U.S.
policymakers can build upon these successes and also make sure
to take particular care to shore up certain aspects that CAFTADR, in its current form, has fallen short. Of note, CAFTA-DR
does not incentivize or mandate efforts to improve labor
conditions in Central America, leaving millions of Central
Americans facing sub-par working conditions and low pay. 5
CAFTA-DR has also been inept to address environmental
externalities associated with increased economic development,
particularly in the manufacturing and natural resources sectors,
which often pollute or cause environmental harms as part of
their operations.6 Further, CAFTA-DR, like other regional trade
1
The Dominican Republic-Central America-United States Free Trade
Agreement, Aug. 2, 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-53, 119 Stat. 462 [hereinafter
CAFTA-DR].
2 See OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES TRADE REP., CAFTA-DR (DOMINICAN
REPUBLIC-CENTRAL AMERICA FTA), https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/freetrade-agreements/cafta-dr-dominican-republic-central-america-fta
(last
visited Oct. 12, 2019) [hereinafter USTR] (stating that the U.S. goods trade
surplus with CAFTA-DR countries was $ 7 billion in 2018).
3
J. F. HORNBECK, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42468, THE DOMINICAN
REPUBLIC-CENTRAL AMERICA-UNITED STATES FREE TRADE AGREEMENT (CAFTADR): DEVELOPMENTS IN TRADE AND INVESTMENT 6 (2012).
4
PETER J. MEYER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL34027, HONDURAS:
BACKGROUND AND U.S. RELATIONS (2019).
5 MAUREEN TAFT-MORALES, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42580, GUATEMALA:
POLITICAL AND SOCIOECONOMIC CONDITIONS AND U.S. RELATIONS 26–27 (2019).
6 See Otto T. Solbrig, The Environmental Agenda in Latin America: The
Issue
of
the
21st
Century,
REVISTA,
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agreements, has not fostered coalitions that were previously
associated with multilateral trade agreements—preventing
unification on key issues affecting trade flows, and preventing a
cohesive response to social and environmental concerns.7
This article will first review the economic, political, and
social conditions in countries that have ratified CAFTA-DR. The
article then considers CAFTA-DR’s provisions and how these
provisions build upon previous efforts at regional integration in
Central America. This article will subsequently analyze how
CAFTA-DR has changed both regional and intercontinental
trade relationships in Central America, as well as how CAFTADR fits within broader trends in regional trade facilitation.
Finally, this article will postulate certain proposals to modernize
and improve CAFTA-DR as its terms are renegotiated in the
coming years.
I.
A.

BACKGROUND

The CAFTA-DR Region.

Before delving into the nuances of CAFTA-DR, a general
understanding of its member states is necessary. Along with the
United States, the Central American nations of Guatemala,
Honduras, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, El Salvador, and Dominican
Republic are members of the trade agreement. Each of these
nations will be briefly discussed in turn.
1.

Guatemala

Guatemala is a nation in Central America that has a
population of roughly 16.91 million people.8 Guatemala has
been particularly befallen by civil wars and turmoil; the country
faced a 36-year internal war between 1960 and 1996.9 Facing
high rates of violence and poverty,10 the country has been unable
to halt drug trafficking due to high levels of corruption amongst
https://revista.drclas.harvard.edu/book/environmental-agenda-latin-america
(describing environmental challenges faced by Central American nations).
7 See discussion infra Section E.
8 TAFT-MORALES, supra note 5, at 1.
9 Id. at 2.
10 Id. at 2–3.
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its government leaders.11
Guatemala has taken strides toward democracy and elected
governance, installing its first democratic government in 1986. 12
Despite economic poverty and insecurity, the country retains
Central America’s largest economy and has seen increased
economic growth in recent years.13 Guatemala’s economic
growth rate peaked at a high of approximately 3.2% in 2018-19,
but is expected to slightly decline until 2022.14 Unfortunately,
strong economic growth in the private sector has not materially
raised living conditions for citizens. Among other research
groups and international institutions, the World Bank has
emphasized that Guatemala needs to improve living conditions
in the country through additional public investment spending. 15
The U.S. and Guatemala have traditionally had a strong
relationship; however, this relationship has become tense in
recent years due to civil turmoil in the country, as well as
violations of international human rights laws.16 Guatemala has
sought amnesty for its human rights violations, which has
largely been opposed by the international community. 17 The
U.S. continues to provide bilateral assistance to Guatemala,
which assists with improving the country’s economic and social
conditions, as well as addressing security issues that Guatemala
is not equipped to fight.18 As part of these initiatives, the U.S.
created its Strategy for Engagement in Central America to
promote living conditions and enhance economic development in
the region, of which Guatemala remains a key recipient of
funding.19
Although largely rejected by Congress, the Trump
Administration has sought to substantially cut aid to
Id. at 3.
Id. at 2.
13 Id. at 15.
14 TAFT-MORALES, supra note 5 (Summary).
15 TAFT-MORALES, supra note 5, at 16.
16 TAFT-MORALES, supra note 5 (Summary).
17
Id. (“Bills introduced in the 116th Congress regarding Guatemala
address immigration, order security, corruption and other governance issues,
and include H.Res. 18, H.R. 1630, and S. 716.”).
18 TAFT-MORALES, supra note 5, at 20–22.
19 Id.
11
12
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Guatemala.20 In March 2019, the Trump Administration also
took action to stop all U.S. military aid to Guatemala after the
country misused armored vehicles that had been delivered to the
country to address drug trafficking.21
2.

Honduras

Honduras is a Central American country with a population
of 9.1 million people.22 The country has enjoyed close relations
with the U.S., and even served as a U.S. military base in the
1980s.23
Honduras already had a significant trading
relationship with the U.S. prior to CAFTA-DR, and the
agreement has bolstered this trade relationship.24 Despite this
history, Honduras has recently been beset by instability and a
wave of Honduras citizens seeking asylum status in the U.S.,
which signals a need to improve the living conditions in the
country.25
3.

Nicaragua

Nicaragua is one of the poorest countries in the region and
has been subject to civil war and dictatorship.26 However,
beginning in the 1990s, Nicaragua began taking strides toward
democracy.27 Attempts at promoting democracy have not
eradicated the country’s significant poverty.28 Like other
Central American countries, the U.S. provides bilateral aid to
Nicaragua. For example, in the 2008 fiscal year, Nicaragua
received $28.6 million in assistance from the U.S., a figure that
has trended upward.29

20
TAFT-MORALES, supra note 5 (Summary) (“Congress rejected much of
those cuts in the reports to and language in the Consolidated Appropriations
Acts of 2018 (P.L. 115-141), and 2019 (P.L. 116-6).”).
21 TAFT-MORALES, supra note 5, at 19–20.
22 MEYER, supra note 4, at 2.
23 MEYER, supra note 4 (Summary).
24 MEYER, supra note 4, at 11.
25 MEYER, supra note 4 (Summary).
26 CLARE RIBANDO SEELKE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS22836, NICARAGUA:
POLITICAL SITUATION AND U.S. RELATIONS (Summary) (2008).
27 SEELKE, supra note 26, at 1.
28 Id.
29 Id. at 3.
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The U.S. has demonstrated its support of Nicaragua in other
capacities, such as promoting democracy and good governance
practices. The U.S. has backed recent democratic leaders in the
country, including Daniel Ortega, a former Sandinista official
(despite concerns regarding his authoritarian proclivities and
ties to Iran and Venezuela).30 The U.S. has also worked with
Nicaragua to reduce its crime rates and drug trafficking.31
4.

Costa Rica

Costa Rica is a nation in Central America with a population
of 5.1 million people.32 The country has traditionally been
economically and politically stable.33 As a result of this stability,
it has been a key partner to the U.S. in promoting democracy in
Central America and elsewhere.34 In 2018, two-way trade
between the U.S. and Costa Rica measured $11.2 billion, with
U.S. exports equaling $6.3 billion, and Costa Rica exports
equaling $4.9 billion.35 This means that the U.S. has enjoyed a
trade surplus of $1.5 billion with Costa Rica.36 Trade with the
U.S. accounted for over 41% of the country’s total trade in 2018. 37
The U.S. primarily exports medical equipment, plastics,
machinery, and refined oil products to Costa Rica.38 Costa Rica
primarily exports fruit, coffee, rubber, and medical equipment to
the U.S.39 In 2017, the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis
determined that U.S. foreign direct investment (FDI) in Costa
Rica totaled $1.6 billion.40 Of this figure, 86% of FDI came from
the manufacturing sector.41

SEELKE, supra note 26 (Summary).
SEELKE, supra note 26, at 5.
32
PETER J. MEYER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., IF10908, COSTA RICA: AN
OVERVIEW (2019).
33 Id.
34 Id.
35 Id.
36 Id.
37 Id.
38 MEYER, supra note 32.
39 Id.
40 Id.
41 Id.
30
31

7

110

5.

PACE INT’L L. REV.

Vol. 32:1

El Salvador

El Salvador was the first nation to ratify and implement
CAFTA-DR.42 Despite its support for the trade agreement and
openness of bilateral trade, El Salvador’s trade flows have
lagged behind other CAFTA-DR nations.43 This trend is likely
due to governance and public security issues, as well as
insufficient investment in the country.44 Even though its trade
has not matched that of other CAFTA-DR countries, the U.S.
remains the top trading partner with El Salvador—in 2018, the
U.S. bought 44% of the items it exported.45 El Salvador
primarily exports sugar, coffee, apparel, and equipment into the
U.S., and in 2018, exported $2.5 billion into the U.S.46 The U.S.
primarily exports plastics, cereals, electrical machinery, fuel oil,
and nuclear parts to El Salvador, and in 2018, was valued at
$3.4 billion.47 This means that the U.S. received approximately
$888 million in trade surplus annually from its trade
relationship with El Salvador.48
6.

Dominican Republic

The Dominican Republic is a large Central American
country located on Hispaniola, which is an island in the
Caribbean.49 The Dominican Republic has traditionally been
considered to be important to the U.S. policy interests.50 In
2017, two-way trade between the U.S. and the Dominican
Republic amounted to over $12.5 billion, up from $9.8 billion
prior to CAFTA-DR.51 In 2017, the U.S. enjoyed a $3 billion
trade surplus with the Dominican Republic.52 However, foreign
traders of counterfeit and illicit goods also find a ready market
CLARE RIBANDO SEELKE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43616, EL SALVADOR:
BACKGROUND AND U.S. RELATIONS 27 (2019).
43 Id.
44 Id.
45 Id.
46 Id.
47 Id.
48 SEELKE, supra note 42.
49 CLARE RIBANDO SEELKE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., IF 10407, DOMINICAN
REPUBLIC (2018).
50 Id.
51 Id.
52 Id.
42
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in the country. In its 2017 Special 301 Report, the Office of the
United States Trade Representative (USTR) determined that
the Dominican Republic has failed to prosecute persons selling
counterfeit goods, which remain readily available in the
country.53
The U.S. has supported the Dominican Republic in its
efforts to address health and security concerns.54 The U.S.
Department of Labor also tracks the Dominican Republic’s
efforts to minimize child labor.55 Despite earlier efforts, the
Trump Administration has recently suggested it will reduce aid
efforts in the region, as it has in other foreign nations.56
B. What is CAFTA-DR?
The Dominican Republic-Central American Free Trade
Agreement, frequently abbreviated as CAFTA-DR, constitutes
the first free trade agreement entered into by the U.S. with six
Central American countries described above—Dominican
Republic, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Guatemala, and
Costa Rica.57 CAFTA-DR was enacted to improve relations and
promote openness of trade between these nations and the U.S.58
CAFTA-DR’s impact has been significant—the combined six
countries constitute the 18th largest trading partner with the
U.S., measuring two way flows of goods valued at $57.4 billion
in 2018.59 Of this figure, the U.S. exported $32.2 billion into
CAFTA-DR countries and $25.2 billion was exported into the
U.S. by the same countries.60 This resulted in a trade surplus of
$7 billion—meaning that U.S. exporters benefited from trading
with CAFTA-DR countries.61
The U.S. Department of
Commerce has estimated that CAFTA-DR has created or
supported approximately 134,000 American jobs.62 CAFTA-DR
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62

Id.
Id.
SEELKE, supra note 49.
Id.
USTR, supra note 2.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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has also promoted labor conditions in the six nations through
various mechanisms that enforce the labor laws of each nation.63
For example, Guatemala was subject to the first labor rights
contest after it failed to allow its workers their rights guaranteed
to them by the laws of Guatemala.64 The U.S. has provided
assistance to promote labor rights in Guatemala to ameliorate
some of the burden on Guatemala to rectify labor conditions;
despite U.S. aid, living conditions in the country generally
remain poor.65
Proponents of CAFTA-DR have argued that the trade
agreement promotes regional stability and economic growth. 66
CAFTA-DR has also promoted transparency, which increases
investors’ proclivity to invest in these countries.67 A stable
economy, in turn, improves communities and living conditions
for local residents.68
CAFTA-DR was implemented by each member nation
separately,69 with El Salvador first, implementing the
agreement on March 1, 2006, and Costa Rica last, implementing
it on January 1, 2009.70 Pursuant to CAFTA-DR, most goods of
these nations may be imported into the U.S. duty-free and will
not be subject to the merchandise processing fee (MPF).71 On
January 1, 2025, the date which CAFTA-DR will be fully
implemented, all goods imported under CAFTA-DR will not be
encumbered by these restrictions.72
USTR, supra note 2.
Id.
65 Id.
66 Id.
67 Id.
68 Id.
69
U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PROT., CENTRAL AMERICA-DOMINICAN
REPUBLIC
FREE
TRADE
AGREEMENT
(CAFTA-DR)
(2019),
https://www.cbp.gov/trade/free-trade-agreements/cafta-dr [hereinafter U.S.
Customs and Border Prot.].
70
See U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PROT., CAFTA-DR SUMMARY (2015),
https://www.cbp.gov/sites/default/files/documents/CAFTA%20Sum%20Page.p
df (providing CAFTA-DR’s implementation date for each country as: El
Salvador: 3/1/06; Nicaragua: 4/1/06; Honduras: 4/1/06; Guatemala: 7/1/06;
Dominican Republic: 3/1/07; and Costa Rica: 1/1/09).
71 U.S. Customs and Border Prot., supra note 69.
72 Id.
63

64
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Negotiations relating to CAFTA-DR’s implementation
started in January 2003,73 and CAFTA-DR was ultimately
signed on August 5, 2004.74 On June 30, 2005, the U.S. Senate
approved legislation implementing the agreement, and the U.S.
House of Representatives followed suit on July 28, 2005.75 On
August 2, 2005, President George W. Bush signed the agreement
into effect.76
Subsequently, Central American countries
approved the agreement.77
CAFTA-DR was implemented pursuant to the U.S.Dominican Republic-Central America Free Trade Agreement
Implementation Act.78
The Implementation Act enables
CAFTA-DR to take effect as to those countries that have abided
by CAFTA-DR’s requirements.79 Under Sections 201–203 of the
Implementation Act, the President may create tariff
modifications as well as rules of origin provisions for preferential
tariff treatment with respect to goods provided for in the
Agreement.80 El Salvador implemented CAFTA-DR pursuant to
Presidential Proclamation 7987, with the agreement taking
effect on March 1, 2006.81
Honduras and Nicaragua
implemented CAFTA-DR pursuant to Presidential Proclamation
7996, with the agreement taking effect on April 1, 2006.82
CAFTA-DR is significant because it builds upon efforts to
eliminate barriers to trade that were started by the 1983
73
M. ANGELES VILLARREAL & KATARINA DE LA ROSA, CONG. RESEARCH
SERV., IF10394, DOMINICAN REPUBLIC-CENTRAL AMERICA-UNITED STATES FREE
TRADE AGREEMENT (CAFTA-DR) (2019).
74 Id.
75 Id.
76 Id.
77 See id. (stating the dates of CAFTA-DR’s adoption as “El Salvador,
Honduras, Nicaragua, and Guatemala by July 1, 2006, the Dominican Republic
on March 1, 2007, and Costa Rica on January 1, 2009.”).
78 Memorandum from the Exec. Dir., Trade Enf’t and Facilitation Office
of Field Operations, to the Dirs., Field Operations 1 (Apr. 26, 2006),
https://www.cbp.gov/sites/default/files/documents/us_dominican.pdf (stating
that the Implementation Act, codified in Public Law 109-53; 119 Stat. 462; 19
U.S.C. 4001 note, was signed into law on August 2, 2005) [hereinafter Memo
for Directors & Field Operations].
79 Id.
80 Id.
81 Id. at 2.
82 Id.
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Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI).83 CAFTA-DR also symbolizes
the U.S.’s commitment to promoting security and democracy in
Central America.84 Proponents of CAFTA-DR believe the
agreement represents an increasing focus toward creating a
regional approach to trade with Central American countries and
supersedes prior unilateral trade agreements, including the
Caribbean Basin Trade Partnership Act (CBPTA) and the
Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act (CBERA).85 CAFTADR additionally creates a binding agreement between the
countries, replacing a series of trade preference agreements.86
The increased flexibility afforded by the rules of origin
provisions has promoted regional integration in Central
America.87 CAFTA-DR has had a particular effect in stabilizing
rules for the service sector, including investment and
intellectual property.88 However, most imports from CAFTA-DR
countries into the U.S. had been duty-free prior to CAFTA-DR,
meaning that the enactment of CAFTA-DR has had a limited
effect on the U.S. economy.89
In particular, CAFTA-DR has promoted regional
integration by harmonizing rules of origin and promoting
market access.90 The reduction of market barriers has led to
increased co-production and economies of scale.91 CAFTA-DR
also installs reciprocal trade rules allowing for enhanced dutyfree treatment.92 For example, if fabric is made in the U.S. but
the final clothing product is produced in Central America, then
the final product would receive duty-free treatment upon return
shipment to the U.S.93

VILLARREAL & DE LA ROSA, supra note 73.
Id.
85
See id. (“Supporters also view the agreement as a way to reinforce
economic stability and encourage regional economic integration.”).
86 Id.
87 Id.
88 Id.
89 VILLARREAL & DE LA ROSA, supra note 73.
90 Id.
91 Id.
92 Id.
93 Id.
83
84
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C. Understanding CAFTA-DR’s Provisions.
CAFTA-DR has twenty-two chapters, which include
“provisions on tariff and nontariff barrier elimination, rules of
origin, customs procedures, sanitary and phyto-sanitary
measures, government procurement, investment, trade in
services, intellectual property rights protection, labor,
environment, and dispute settlement.”94
1.

General Rules of Origin

The general rules of origin, which assist with determining
whether a good may receive preferential tariff treatment, are
laid out in Section 203 of the CAFTA-DR Implementation Act. 95
To determine the origin of a good under CAFTA-DR, GN29
provides definitions and specific rules of origin to assist in
making a determination.96 CAFTA-DR was drafted based upon
similar rules of origin criteria as was used in a number of other
trade agreements, including the Australia Free Trade
Agreement and the U.S.-Chile Free Trade Agreement.97 The
burden is on the importer to substantiate a good’s origin.98 A
non-textile good is deemed to have originated where it was
obtained or produced entirely in one or more of the countries that
abide by the CAFTA-DR, so long as each of the materials used
in its production are classified pursuant to GN29(n), and the
goods meet all other requirements; it also could be deemed to
have originated where it was obtained or produced if the good is
produced entirely in a country that abides by the CAFTA-DR
and is created solely from originating materials from that
country.99
Id.
Memo for Directors & Field Operations, supra note 78, at 2.
96 Id.
97 Id.
98 Id. at 9.
99
Id. at 2–3 (“Generally, under the CAFTA-DR, a non-textile good is
originating where: (a) The good is wholly obtained or produced entirely in the
territory of one or more of the Parties (Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala,
Honduras, Nicaragua, Dominican Republic or the U.S.); (b) The good is
produced entirely in the territory of one or more of the Parties and (i) Each of
the non-originating materials used in the production of the good undergoes an
applicable charge in the tariff classification specified in GN29(n); or (ii) The
good otherwise satisfies any applicable regional value content (RVC) specified
in GN29(n); and the good satisfies all other applicable requirements; or (c) The
94
95
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Most goods, except those enumerated in GN29, are subject
to a de minimis provision of 10 percent.100 Textile goods are
subject to a separate de minimis provision outlined in
GN29(d)(i).101 The de minimis rule provides that “a good that
contains materials that do not undergo a required change in
tariff clarification (tariff shift) as specified in GN29(n), may still
qualify as originating if the value of all non-originating
materials, used in the production of the good, that do not
undergo the required change in classification does not exceed
10% of the adjusted value of the good.”102 Further, “[t]he de
minimis provision applies provided that the value of such nonoriginating materials will be included in the total value of nonoriginating materials for any applicable RVC requirement.” 103
Certain exceptions to the de minimis provision are located in
GN29(e)(ii) of the HTS.104
2.

Customs Administration

After a rule of origin determination is made, customs must
be administered. CAFTA-DR is drafted so that goods can clear
customs quickly.105 Customs officials are required to release
goods meeting customs requirements within forty-eight hours of
arrival; they must release goods at their point of arrival without
sending such goods to a storage facility first; and they must
allow goods to be withdrawn by importers at any point before a
final fee decision is rendered.106 Express shipments must be
approved within six hours after the shipment has reached an
entry point and all appropriate documentation is provided. 107
CAFTA-DR has a number of provisions designed to bolster
transparency during customs administration.108 CAFTA-DR
countries must openly publish their customs law and relevant
good is produced entirely in the territory of one or more of the Parties
exclusively from originating materials.”).
100 Id. at 3.
101 Memo for Directors & Field Operations, supra note 78, at 3.
102 Id.
103 Id.
104 Id.
105
Lisa A. Crosby & Michael J. Smart, CAFTA: New Rules, New
Opportunities, 12 INT’L TRADE L. & REG. 41, 41 (2006).
106 CAFTA-DR, supra note 1, art. 5.2.
107 Id. art. 5.7(e).
108 Id. art. 5.1.
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regulations; must accept questions regarding customs issues;109
must publish any proposed customs regulations and allow for
public comment prior to adoption;110 must provide tariff rules
and classifications in an advance writing;111 and must ensure
that importers can have customs decisions reviewed by an
independent judicial body.112 CAFTA-DR also requires that
customs information remain confidential.113
3.

Legal Protections for Investors

CAFTA-DR enhances protections for investors within
CAFTA-DR member countries.
In particular, CAFTA-DR
guarantees non-discriminatory treatment to investors and
requires “no less favorable” treatment to the investors of any
CAFTA-DR member country.114 CAFTA-DR also affords the
right to repatriate profits and make other capital transfers
relating to an investment;115 protects against expropriation
without prompt, adequate, and effective compensation;116 and
guarantees fair and equitable treatment as well as full
protection and security of their investments.117
Under CAFTA-DR, an investment is broadly defined to
include a number of intangible and tangible assets; including:
commercial enterprises, stocks, equity, bonds, shares,
debentures, options or other derivatives, futures, intellectual
property, licenses and permits, movable or immovable property,
contracts, and other property including leases, liens, and
mortgages.118
As will be discussed in the following section, CAFTA-DR
promotes investment from U.S. investors by ensuring the

109
110
111
112
113
114
115
116
117
118

Id. art. 5.1(1).
Id. art. 5.1(3).
Id. art. 5.5.
CAFTA-DR, supra note 1, art. 5.8.
Id. art. 5.4.
CAFTA-DR, supra note 1, arts. 10.3, 10.4.
Id. art. 10.8.
Id. art. 10.7.
Id. art. 10.5.
Id. art. 10.28; Crosby & Smart, supra note 105, at 43.
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availability of arbitration for investor-state disputes.119 The
investor and state may initially engage in communications
regarding the dispute, but if such negotiations fail, then CAFTADR guarantees that a panel of three arbitrators—one arbitrator
selected by each party and a third arbitrator selected pursuant
to the agreement—may decide the dispute.120 The arbitral panel
has the authority to award restitution, money damages,
attorney’s fees, and other costs.121
CAFTA-DR enhances protections for cross-border service
suppliers. CAFTA-DR guarantees that service suppliers will
receive “treatment no less favourable than [a nation] accords to
its own service suppliers or service suppliers from any third
country.”122 Cross-border service suppliers also cannot be
required to establish a local presence in a region prior to
providing services.123 CAFTA-DR creates exceptions to the
foregoing rules due to specific economic needs of each CAFTADR member country.124
CAFTA-DR guarantees that U.S. banks and financial
institutions will not be discriminated against when they
establish, expand, operate, or sell their investments in CAFTADR countries.125 U.S. financial institutions also may not be
discriminated against when providing specific services, such as
“maritime shipping and commercial aviation insurance,
reinsurance and financial advisory services, such as investment
advice and advice on mergers and acquisitions.”126 Finally, U.S.
financial institutions cannot be discriminated against when

119 CAFTA-DR, supra note 1, arts. 10.15–10.27; Crosby & Smart, supra
note 105, at 43.
120 CAFTA-DR, supra note 1, arts 10.15, 10.16, 10.19.
121 Crosby & Smart, supra note 105, at 43.
122 Id. at 43–44; CAFTA-DR, supra note 1, arts. 11.2, 11.3.
123 CAFTA-DR, supra note 1, art. 11.5; Crosby & Smart, supra note 105,
at 44.
124 CAFTA-DR, supra note 1, art. 11.6; Crosby & Smart, supra note 105,
at 44.
125 CAFTA-DR, supra note 1, art. 12.2; Crosby & Smart, supra note 105,
at 44.
126 Crosby & Smart, supra note 105, at 44; CAFTA-DR, supra note 1, art.
12.5.
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providing portfolio management services.127
4.

Investor-State Dispute Settlement Mechanisms

CAFTA-DR has a dispute settlement mechanism in place for
when one party believes that the agreement’s terms are not
being properly implemented, thus preventing that party from
receiving benefits it believes it should receive.128 The first step
in the dispute settlement process is for the parties to consult
with the Free Trade Commission for mediation.129 If this step
fails, the parties may then seek the assistance of arbitration. 130
Upon review of the case, the arbitral panel will issue a report
with its determination of the matter and may make
recommendations—if the disputing Parties requests them—as
to how the dispute may be resolved.131 This report will dictate
how the dispute should be resolved.132 If disputing parties are
unable to reach an agreement as to how the dispute should be
resolved, the parties will be required to negotiate an acceptable
compensation amount.133 If a compensation amount cannot be
agreed upon, then the aggrieved party may seek trade
sanctions.134
CAFTA-DR expands upon the WTO’s dispute mechanism. 135
127

12.9(2).

Crosby & Smart, supra note 105, at 44; CAFTA-DR, supra note 1, art.

128 Crosby & Smart, supra note 105, at 44; CAFTA-DR, supra note 1, arts.
20.2, annex 20.2.
129 CAFTA-DR, supra note 1, art. 20.5; Crosby & Smart, supra note 105,
at 44.
130 CAFTA-DR, supra note 1, art. 20.6; Crosby & Smart, supra note 105,
at 44.
131 CAFTA-DR, supra note 1, art. 20.13; Crosby & Smart, supra note 105,
at 44.
132 See CAFTA-DR, supra note 1, art. 20.15 (describing the process once
a final report is received as “[o]n receipt of the final report of a panel, the
disputing Parties shall agree on the resolution of the dispute, which normally
shall conform with the determinations and recommendations, if any, of the
panel.”).
133 Id. art. 20.16.
134
See id. 20.16(2) (describing the process of giving notice to issue
sanctions as “any such complaining Party may at any time thereafter provide
written notice to the Party complained against that it intends to suspend the
application to the Party complained against of benefits of equivalent effect.”).
135 Id. art. 20.3(1) (“Where a dispute regarding any matter arises under
this Agreement and under another free trade agreement to which the disputing
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CAFTA-DR is unique in that it provides parties with
opportunities to consult on measures before they are required to
adhere to the final agreement.136 The intention behind allowing
consultation prior to becoming part of the final agreement was
to provide foreign investors with the ability to state their
position before a measure was adopted, thereby easing certain
concerns held by foreign investors in the event of a dispute.137
Signatory countries are also provided the right to state their
position as to how the agreement should be interpreted or
applied during another party’s adjudicatory proceedings.138 An
aggrieved party must choose between CAFTA-DR or the WTO’s
dispute resolution procedures.139 To prevent parties from
seeking judicial assistance in both forums, a forum selection
clause requires the selection of a forum.140
CAFTA-DR’s Chapter 10—which houses the agreement’s
investor-state dispute settlement mechanism—is created in the
shadow of NAFTA’s Chapter 11.141 Currently, five investor-state
arbitrations have been brought pursuant to CAFTA-DR
disputes: “(1) Railroad Development Corp. v. Guatemala (2007);
(2) TCW Group Inc. v. Dominican Republic (2007); (3) Pacific
Rim Cayman v. El Salvador (2008); (4) TECO Energy Inc. v.
Guatemala (2009); and (5) Commerce Group Corp. and San
Sebastian Gold Mines Inc. v. El Salvador (2009).”142 Each of
Parties are party or the WTO Agreement, the complaining Party may select
the forum in which to settle the dispute.”).
136 Id. art. 20.4(1) (“Any Party may request in writing consultations with
any other Party with respect to any actual or proposed measure or any other
matter that it considers might affect the operation of this Agreement.”).
137 See id. art. 10.15 (“In the event of an investment dispute, the claimant
and the respondent should initially seek to resolve the dispute through
consultation and negotiation, which may include the use of non-binding, thirdparty procedures such as conciliation and mediation.”).
138 CAFTA-DR, supra note 1, art. 20.20.
139 Id. art. 20.3(1).
140 Id. art. 20.3(2) (“Once the complaining Party has requested a panel
under an agreement referred to in paragraph 1, the forum selected shall be
used to the exclusion of the others.”).
141 See Daniel E. González et al., Investment-Related Legal Documents in
Central America. and the Dominican Republic, in 76 INT’L J. ARB., MEDIATION
& DISP. MGMT. 70 (2010) (discussing investor-state dispute settlement
mechanisms).
142 Id. (alteration in original).
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these arbitrations are related to natural resources and
infrastructure development disputes.143
Chapter 10’s
investment provisions are not retroactive.144 Thus, foreign
investors may only contest government actions arising after
CAFTA-DR took effect.145
CAFTA-DR has been particularly effective in enabling
foreign investors to assist with meeting Central America’s
natural resource and infrastructure needs.146 CAFTA-DR has
increased foreign investment relating to natural resource
manufacturing, including metal mining and extractive
industries.147 The Inter-American Development Bank has
provided additional assistance in helping foreign investors
develop infrastructure projects in Central America, and in
January 2009, provided a $60 million loan for the Central
American Mezzanine Infrastructure Fund (CAMIF).148 CAMIF
seeks to increase its available loan assistance to $150 million
over time.149
Under CAFTA-DR, U.S. investors may also begin an
arbitration pursuant to the ICSID Convention.150 Only the
Dominican Republic is not a member of the ICSID
Convention.151 The advantages of utilizing ICSID include that
the forum has established investor-state case law and enacted
procedural rules.152
Furthermore, ICSID is located in
Washington, D.C., which may be a more convenient location for
U.S. investors.153 ICSID has already proven important to
resolving disputes under CAFTA-DR, with three of the five
Id.
Id.
145 Id.
146 Id. at 72.
147 González et al., supra note 141, at 72.
148 Id.
149 Id.
150 Id. at 75; see also CAFTA-DR, supra note 1, art. 10.16(3) (providing
that “a claimant may submit a claim . . . (a) under the ICSID Convention . . .
(b) under the ICSID Additional Facility Rules . . . or (c) under the UNCITRAL
Arbitration Rules.”).
151 González et al., supra note 141, at 76.
152 Id.
153 Id.
143
144
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disputes having been adjudicated in this forum.154
CAFTA-DR includes a fee-shifting provision, which permits
the award of attorney’s fees to the prevailing party if a frivolous
action is brought against that party.155 This fee-shifting
provision was created to deter a financially-strapped CAFTA-DR
country from “pro forma challenging the jurisdiction of an
investor’s claim.”156 Because such jurisdictional objections
frequently only delay arbitration proceedings, such provisions
will reduce unnecessary time and expense associated with
arbitration.157 The fee-shifting provision likely means that
CAFTA-DR respondent nations will be less likely to file
jurisdictional objections to an investor’s claims.158
CAFTA-DR Chapter 10 employs a U.S. definition of indirect
expropriation.159
Pursuant to Annex 10-C(4), indirect
expropriation it is defined as:
[A]n action . . . by a Party [that] has an effect equivalent to direct
expropriation without formal transfer of title or outright
seizure . . . and requires [that a reviewing arbitral panel conduct]
a case-by-case, fact-based inquiry that considers, among other
factors: (i) the economic impact of the government action . . . (ii)
the extent to which the government actions interferes with
distinct, reasonable investment-backed expectations; and (iii) the
character of the government action.160

Id.
Id.; see also CAFTA-DR, supra note 1, art.10.20(6) (“When it decides
a respondent’s objection . . . [to jurisdiction], the tribunal may, if warranted,
award to the prevailing disputing party reasonable costs and attorney’s fees
incurred in submitting or opposing the objection. In determining whether such
an award is warranted, the tribunal shall consider whether either the
claimant’s claim or the respondent’s objection was frivolous . . . .”).
156 González et al., supra note 141, at 76.
157 Id.
158
Id. at 77; see also R.R. Dev. Corp. v. Guatemala, ICSID Case No.
ARB/07/23 (2007) (rejecting Respondent’s objection to jurisdiction based on the
validity of the Claimant’s waivers of right to initiate).
159 CAFTA-DR, supra note 1, annex 10-C; González et al., supra note 141,
at 77.
160 CAFTA-DR, supra note 1, annex 10-C; González et al., supra note 141,
at 77.
154
155
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This three-pronged test is derived from U.S. law—it is
modeled after the U.S. Supreme Court’s landmark standard set
forth in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York.161
The intention behind modeling the indirect expropriation
standard after U.S. law is so that U.S. investors receive the same
protections investing in CAFTA-DR countries as they would be
afforded had they invested domestically.162
The CAFTA-DR standard provides a clearer interpretation
as to which type of acts can constitute indirect expropriation,
thus reducing uncertainty between investors.163 By contrast,
NAFTA Chapter 11 employs a more ambiguous “tantamount to
expropriation” standard.164 However, it is important to note that
arbitration tribunals have not yet regularly interpreted the
Penn Central indirect expropriation standard, so any differences
between the CAFTA-DR and NAFTA indirect expropriation
standards remain to be seen.165
II. ANALYSIS
CAFTA-DR has been a boon to Central American trade—
increasing overall trade and foreign direct investment flows;
trade composition has also shifted favorably.166 CAFTA-DR fits
within the broader international trade landscape, which is
shifting towards trade regionalization.167 CAFTA-DR has
strengthened regional integration where multilateral trade
agreements have failed, though limitations associated with
regional trade agreements remain.168 To a lesser extent,
161 See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of N.Y, 438 U.S. 104, 123–125
(1978) (holding that to determine if a regulatory action that diminishes the
value of a Claimant’s property constitutes a “taking” of that property, the court
must consider the economic impact of the regulation on the Claimant, the
extent to which the regulation has interfered with distinct investment-backed
expectations, and the character of the governmental action); see also González
et al., supra note 141, at 77 (stating the factor to determine where an action
constitutes an indirect expropriation).
162 González et al., supra note 141, at 77.
163 CAFTA-DR, supra note 1, annex 10-C.
164 González et al., supra note 141, at 76.
165 Id.
166 VILLARREAL & DE LA ROSA, supra note 73.
167 Id.
168 Id.
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CAFTA-DR has promoted social change, such as improving
working conditions for laborers. However, living and working
conditions for many, perhaps the majority, persons in Central
America remain poor.169 Each of the foregoing trends will be
discussed in turn.
A. CAFTA-DR has Increased Bilateral Trade Flows and has
Altered Trade Composition.
CAFTA-DR has increased trade flows and has altered trade
composition. The U.S. has traditionally been the top trading
partner with CAFTA-DR nations, though the U.S.’ prominence
has recently decreased somewhat.170 In 2018, CAFTA-DR
nations exported 45% of their total exports to the U.S.; 39% of
the goods imported into these countries were imported from the
U.S.171 After CAFTA-DR’s passage, U.S. exports to CAFTA-DR
countries have increased at a faster rate than imports from
CAFTA-DR countries into the U.S.172 Since CAFTA-DR took
effect, bilateral trade flows, originating from both CAFTA-DR
countries and the U.S., have grown in the aggregate.173
Coupled with increased overall trade, trade composition has
shifted since CAFTA-DR took effect—CAFTA-DR nations have
increasingly exported more expensive and sophisticated goods,
such as semiconductors and medical equipment, while
traditional exports, such as apparel and textile, have waned. 174
In 2018, the U.S.’s exports into CAFTA-DR countries
consisted of “petroleum and coal products (22%); fibers, yarns
and threads (5%); oilseeds and grains (5%); resin and synthetic
rubber products (3%); and communications equipment (3%).”175
The U.S. has imported from CAFTA-DR countries a variety of
goods, including “apparel (32%); fruits and tree nuts (13%);
medical equipment and supplies (11%); motor vehicle parts (5%);
169
170
171
172
173
174
175

Id.
Id.
Id.
VILLARREAL & DE LA ROSA, supra note 73.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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tobacco products (4%); and electrical equipment (1%).”176
CAFTA-DR has reduced the tariff rates on goods from 8.5%
in 2006 to 1.9% in 2010.177 This resulted in an increase in
imports from the U.S. and elsewhere (including China, Mexico,
and Venezuela) into the Dominican Republic.178 China sent a
variety of manufactured goods, such as footwear, equipment,
and electronics into the country.179 Venezuela largely imported
oil, and Mexico imported electronics and oil.180 In 2011,
Dominican Republic received 10% of its imports from China,
6.9% from Venezuela, and 6.1% from Mexico.181
B. CAFTA-DR has Increased Foreign Direct Investment.
CAFTA-DR has increased foreign direct investment flows,
which depicts the amount of foreign investment flowing into the
country.182 Foreign direct investment flows generally bear a
close relationship to free trade agreements.183 Free trade
agreements can promote foreign investment by protecting
foreign investors and stabilizing market access.184
U.S.
investors have traditionally been the top investors in CAFTADR nations, though underlying macroeconomic conditions make
it difficult to determine the exact magnitude of this investment
and how CAFTA-DR’s safeguards have affected these trends.185
Most foreign direct investment in Central America relates to the
services sector.186 In 2018, El Salvador, the Dominican Republic,
and Costa Rica had the highest FDI flows originating from the
U.S.187 In particular, Costa Rica and Dominican Republic’s FDI
flows may be attributed to the nations’ economic and political
Id.
Chad P. Bown & Mark Wu, Safeguards and the Perils of Preferential
Trade Agreements: Dominican Republic–Safeguard Measures, 13 WORLD
TRADE REV. 179, 187 (2014).
178 Id.
179 Id. at 188.
180 Id.
181 Id.
182 VILLARREAL & DE LA ROSA, supra note 73.
183 Id.
184 Id.
185 Id.
186 Id.
187 Id.
176
177
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stability, as well as high productivity levels in these nations.188
C. CAFTA-DR has Promoted Labor Rights, but More Remains
to be Done.
CAFTA-DR was one of the earliest trade agreements to
particularly incorporate labor capacity building provisions. 189
Under CAFTA-DR, a country must “not fail to effectively enforce
its labor laws, through a sustained or recurring course of action
or inaction, in a manner affecting trade.”190 Monetary penalties
are capped in labor disputes.191 A labor cooperation mechanism,
labor affairs council, and labor capacity building device all assist
with implementing labor commitments under CAFTA-DR.192
Labor rights under CAFTA-DR have been a particular point
of contention. Several key issues have arisen, including whether
CAFTA-DR countries had promulgated laws in accordance with
the principles set forth by the International Labor Organization
(ILO), and whether countries were adequately able to enforce
such laws.193 Leaders in CAFTA-DR countries have recognized
that they lack adequate financial resources.194 Avenues for
improving working conditions remain a key concern.195 Further,
in three instances, the U.S. has taken action after finding that
Guatemala, Honduras, and the Dominican Republic did not
abide by their promises relating to working conditions.196 In
each instance, the U.S. attempted to engage with the offending
country and devise a labor plan to rectify the labor violation. 197
Despite these efforts, tangible improvements in working
conditions have been slow and uneven.198
For example, in April 2008, the American Federation of
188
189
190
191
192
193
194
195
196
197
198

VILLARREAL & DE LA ROSA, supra note 73.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
VILLARREAL & DE LA ROSA, supra note 73.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO) and
six labor unions based in Guatemala launched a complaint
asserting that Guatemala had not adequately enforced its labor
laws by failing to provide appropriate working conditions and
had impinged upon workers’ rights to bargain, organize, and
associate with others.199 In January 2009, an OTLA report was
published summarizing these findings.200 In 2010, the U.S.,
finding that Guatemala had “‘not undertaken effective steps to
correct systemic failures’ in labor law enforcement,” began
consulting with the country.201 After these consultations did not
yield meaningful change, the U.S. had an arbitral panel
installed in August 2011.202
In April 2013, Guatemala and the U.S. entered into a labor
enforcement agreement with eighteen points of improvement.203
However, Guatemala was unable to meet the terms of the labor
enforcement agreement, and the dispute was arbitrated from
2014 to 2017.204 Ultimately, the arbitral panel sided with
Guatemala, finding that “while Guatemala failed to enforce
certain laws, the evidence did not provide it was ‘sustained or
recurring’ and ‘in a manner affecting trade,’ and thus did not
violate FTA provisions.”205
The WTO rules do not include labor standards, while the
ILO is generally the formal body that oversees labor issues. 206
Due to the lack of labor protections pursuant to WTO rules,
many free trade agreements specifically include labor
provisions.207 For example, the U.S. requires that workers be
given specific rights in exchange for Central American and other
developing countries to receive particular trade benefits. 208
Trade agreements entered into by the U.S. and developing
199
CATHLEEN D. CIMINO-ISAACS, CONG. RES. SERV., IF 10972, LABOR
ENFORCEMENT ISSUES IN U.S. FTAS (2019).
200 Id.
201 Id.
202 Id.
203 Id.
204 Id.
205 CIMINO-ISAACS, supra note 199 (alteration in original).
206 Id.
207 Id.
208 Id.
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nations have been particularly noted for their emphasis on labor
rights.209 This trend has also increased labor provisions in trade
agreements across the world, with a report by the ILO finding
that “as of 2016, 77 out of 267 FTAs globally included labor
provisions, compared to 21 to 2005.”210 Labor provisions found
in trade agreements not entered into by the U.S. differ from
those by the U.S. because dispute settlement for labor provisions
is generally not required in non-U.S. trade agreements.211 Most
of these labor provisions employ a collaborative approach that
promote capacity building, monitoring, and discussions with the
offending nation.212 Rather than impose trade sanctions upon
the offending country, a cooperative approach is generally
sought.213
D. The Failed TPP and Lessons Learned.
At one time, the proposed Trans-Pacific Partnership
Agreement (TPP) was thought to be the future of trade, and
many CAFTA-DR countries had demonstrated an interest in
signing the TPP had it taken effect.214 Although the TPP never
took effect (and is unlikely to ever do so), this willingness
suggests that new possibilities exist to further bolster the trade
relationship between the U.S. and Central America.215 One way
to benefit from this enhanced relationship would be to expand
the harmonized rules of origin with other Central American
nations that are not CAFTA-DR members and to look for
avenues to bolster co-production.216 The U.S. could also work
with Central American countries to shape its existing trade
facilitation agenda to further enhance shared goals.217 Through
these efforts, Central American countries and the U.S. can
further facilitate economic growth in the region.218 Finally, the
U.S. could engage in increased formal or informal discussions
209
210
211
212
213
214
215
216
217
218

Id.
Id.
CIMINO-ISAACS, supra note 199.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
CIMINO-ISAACS, supra note 199.
Id.
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with Central American countries and solicit their opinions on
mechanisms to promote trade and use these recommendations
to create a multinational strategy.219
E. How CAFTA-DR and Other Regional Trade Agreements
have Assisted where Multilateral Negotiations have Fallen
Short.
Before 2000, multilateral negotiations were the
predominant mechanism for trade negotiations.220
The
increased use of trade agreements resulted from the failure of
the 1999 Seattle Ministerial and the 2003 Cancún Ministerial to
achieve a trade consensus.221 Since multilateral negotiations
have often failed, WTO members have increasingly looked to
regional trade agreements to fill these gaps.222 Regionalization
of trade agreements can be attributed, in part, to the break-up
of the Soviet Union and instability in Eastern Europe.223
The 1999 Seattle Ministerial served as a turning point for
support of regional trade agreements.224 Most countries now
negotiate a variety of regional trade agreements to incorporate
issues relevant to a particular region.225 Moreover, those nations
that did not have regional trade agreements in place before 1999
have increasingly begun to enter into such agreements.226
Depictive of this trend, prior to 1999, the U.S. only had
Id.
Bryan Mercurio, The WTO and Its Institutional Impediments, 8
MELBOURNE J. INT’L L. 198, 217 (2007).
221 Id.; see also Jo-Ann Crawford & Roberto V. Fiorentino, The Changing
Landscape of Regional Trade Agreements 16 (World Trade Org., Working
Paper No. 8, 2005) (discussing the motivations for the increased use of regional
trade agreements).
222 Crawford & Fiorentino, supra note 221, at 5–6.
223
Id. at 6; see also Mercurio, supra note 220, at 218 (finding the
development of thirteen goods agreements and eleven agreements covering
trade in the 1990s unsurprising due to the break-up of the Soviet Union).
224 Mercurio, supra note 220, at 217.
225 Id.; see also John Whalley, Recent Regional Agreements: Why So Many,
Who So Much Variance in Form, Why Coming So Far, and Where Are They
Headed?, 31 WORLD ECON., 517, 519–21 (2008) (finding that nations such as the
United States and Canada have made efforts to go regional with one another).
226 Whalley, supra note 225, at 520–21; Mercurio, supra note 220, at 218–
21.
219
220

27

130

PACE INT’L L. REV.

Vol. 32:1

entered into regional trade agreements with Israel, Mexico, and
Canada.227 After 1999, the U.S. entered into regional trade
agreements with a number of countries, including “Australia,
Bahrain, Chile, CAFTA-DR (Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, El
Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua), Jordan,
Morocco, Oman, and Singapore.”228
The shift away from multilateral trade agreements confers
certain benefits.229 Because regional trade agreements are only
entered into between smaller groups of countries, they can be
entered into more efficiently and allow for good-faith discussions
during the negotiation process.230 This also means that regional
trade agreements may be more effective than multilateral trade
agreements in increasing market access, reducing non-tariff
barriers, promoting efficiency, and solidifying shared
commitments.231 Regional trade agreements may also build
support for issues, such as environmental, labor, and investment
policies, that do not yet have multilateral support.232 They can
also include heightened threshold protections for enforcement
standards and other rights.233 Further, these agreements can
assist nations in diversifying their trade portfolios and
promoting a competitive advantage through economies of
scale.234 Finally, regional trade agreements can promote
regional economic and political security.235
Mercurio, supra note 220, at 218.
Id.; Australia-United States Free Trade Agreement, signed 18 May
2004 [2005] ATS I (entered into force 1 January 2005); Bahrain-United States
Free Trade Agreement, signed 14 September 2004 (entered into force 1 August
2006); Jordan-United States Free Trade Agreement, signed 24 October 24,
2001 (entered into force 7 December 2001); Morocco-United States Free Trade
Agreement, signed 15 June 15, 2004 (entered into force 1 January 2006);
Oman-United States Free Trade Agreement, signed 19 January 19,
2006 (entered into force 26 September 2006); Singapore-United States Free
Trade Agreement (signed 6 May 6, 2003 (entered into force 1 January 2004).
229 Mercurio, supra note 220, at 221.
230
Id.; see also Michael Ewing-Chow, Southeast Asia and Free Trade
Agreements: WTO Plus or Bust?, 8 SING. Y.B. INT’L L. 193, 196 (2004)
(discussing the likelihood of success in bilateral trade negotiations over
multilateral trade negotiations).
231 Mercurio, supra note 220, at 221.
232 Id.
233 Id.
234 Id.
235 Id.
227
228
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However, regional trade agreements are characterized by
certain drawbacks.236 First, those nations that are not members
of the regional trade agreement are placed at a disadvantage
when they seek to trade with member nations.237 Second,
concerns have arisen that regional trade agreements could affect
the WTO’s authority to oversee international trade.238 Regional
trade agreements may also promote market access and reduce
tariff rates, promoting trade inefficiencies, when a more efficient
trading partner would otherwise be selected.239 More efficient or
less expensive producers of the same good in a non-member
country would thus lose out on trading opportunities.240
Further, the increase in regional trade agreements may also
promote confusion—a number of regional trade agreements
could conflict or be otherwise inconsistent with the rule set forth
in another trade agreement, leading to confusion and trade
insecurity.241 Regional trade agreements also have not proven
sufficient to address larger-scale trading issues, such as
installing appropriate trading remedies and imposing fishery
subsidies in shared waters.242 Additionally, regional trade
agreements may reduce developing countries’ ability to create
coalitions to influence trading policies set forth by stronger
nations.243 Finally, regional trade agreements have largely been
ineffective in coalition building.244
III. RECOMMENDATIONS
Because CAFTA-DR has greatly benefited Central
American trade and has created a trade surplus in the U.S., it
can readily be modernized for the next generation of Central
American trade, so long as bilateral support is achieved. 245
Id.
Mercurio, supra note 220, at 221.
238 Id.
239 Id.
240 Id. at 222.
241 Id.
242 Id.
243 Mercurio, supra note 220, at 222.
244 Id.
245 SEELKE, supra note 42 (“Although U.S. Trade Representative Robert
Lighthizer has asserted that CAFTA-DR and other trade arrangements
236
237
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Certain key considerations should be incorporated into
upcoming revisions to CAFTA-DR. First, continued emphasis
should be placed on monitoring and policing labor rights
violations. Second, new provisions can be installed to address
environmental externalities associated with increased
development in Central America. Third, CAFTA-DR can be
modernized to assist with coalition building and other goals that
multilateral trade agreements previously sought to address.
Western nations can also use CAFTA-DR to further trade
capacity building and economic growth in Central America.
Finally, safeguards for investors should be improved to promote
economic growth even if the region shows signs of instability.
A. Continue Emphasis on Monitoring and Policing Labor
Rights Violations.
As described above, the living and working conditions in a
number of Central American nations remain significantly worse
than those conditions in their developed counterparts. As
depicted in the Guatemala arbitration, the creation of these poor
living and working standards has, for the most part, not been
caused by willful behaviors by the Guatemalan government nor
by the local employers.246 Consequently, imposing sanctions or
any other penalty on CAFTA-DR nations for violating labor
rights standards is not likely to be effective. Instead, a policy of
providing assistance to these nations should be employed. For
example, large scale foreign investors could receive incentives—
such as U.S. tax breaks or other fiscal incentives—if they provide
particular wages or working conditions to their workers.
Improving workers’ rights is good business practice and is likely
to be the most effective mechanism in improving labor conditions
in Central America.
B. Address Climate Change and Environmental Externalities.
As CAFTA-DR countries increasingly develop and
modernize, these countries are often unable to address the
environmental externalities associated with their increased
throughout Latin America ‘need to be modernized,’ the Trump Administration
has not yet sought to renegotiate the agreement.”).
246 See supra Section III.C.
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growth. Research has found that climate change can be
particularly attributed to the rapid industrialization of
developing nations.247 To this end, foreign investors should be
required to adhere to stringent environmental regulations (such
as those that would be found in the U.S.) during the development
of large and small-scale projects within CAFTA-DR nations.
Loan assistance from outside nations, NGOs, corporations, and
other governments should also require that a small percentage
of the funds be dedicated to environmental efforts and
remediation.
Even on a smaller scale, CAFTA-DR countries are often
beset by local environmental issues, such as deforestation, soil
erosion, and water and air pollution.248 Here too, foreign
investors could be required to allocate a small portion of their
project funds to address the environmental remediation and any
possible environmental impacts associated with infrastructure
projects or other developments for which their goods are
subsequently used. Small-scale foreign investors, as well as
traders of finished goods for personal use, could receive U.S. and
other tax breaks to dedicate to environmental assistance,
especially where the trade of a good causes negative
environmental impacts in Central America (such as refined oil,
building materials, and other goods used for infrastructure
development). These efforts would introduce a collaborative
approach to solve both large-scale and small-scale
environmental issues affecting both local communities in
Central America and the world.

247 See IMF, Seeking Sustainable Growth: Short-Term Recovery, LongTerm Challenges, World Economic Outlook (Oct. 2017) (explaining that
developing countries often lack resources to address environmental issues
associated with industrialization); see, e.g., Developing Countries Need Urgent
Support to Adapt to Climate Change, UNITED NATIONS (Oct. 12, 2017),
https://unfccc.int/news/developing-countries-need-urgent-support-to-adapt-toclimate-change (explaining that developing countries often lack resources to
address environmental issues associated with industrialization).
248 Solbrig, supra note 6.
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C. Modernize CAFTA-DR’s Terms to Align with Multilateral
Goals.
As described, trade agreements have become increasingly
regionalized, replacing prior efforts at multilateral
agreements.249 While the demise of multilateral agreements has
been associated with lack of coalition building and lack of
unification, regional agreements, such as CAFTA-DR, provide
an opportunity to enhance relationships with trading partners
in new ways. For example, increased regionalization of trade
agreements opens up the opportunity for discussions between
smaller groups of countries facing similar concerns—such as
corruption, economic instability, environmental disasters, or
severe poverty.250
These trade negotiations could place
heightened emphasis on rectifying these issues and could enable
a dialogue by which shared interests may be advanced. The
improved trading relationship between the U.S. and Central
America could also create an opportunity for dialogue on other
issues, such as corporate governance, increased minimum
wages, access to health care, and leading social issues. Through
these efforts, Central American countries and the U.S. could
further facilitate economic growth and promote living and
working conditions in the region.251 This process—if designed
more as an opportunity for increased bilateral dialogue, rather
than formal trade negotiations—could promote trade while
granting an occasion to address the shared goals that
multilateral agreements once sought to address.252
D. Promote Trade Capacity Building and Economic Growth in
the Region.
The U.S. already assists with trade capacity building in
Central America, meaning it supports these nations with
developing their internal industries for trade, as well as other
avenues for economic growth. Such efforts—typically in the
form of loans or other financial assistance—have proven
beneficial in promoting economic growth in Central America to
Crawford & Fiorentino, supra note 221, at 6.
Mercurio, supra note 220, at 221.
251 See id. (describing what Central American countries and the U.S. can
do through agreement).
252 Id.
249
250
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some extent. However, prior efforts by the government of the
U.S. and other nations to provide this assistance have fallen
short. Consequently, to further promote trade capacity building,
CAFTA-DR could be modernized so that foreign investors play a
heightened role in bringing new technologies and business
concepts to Central America. Foreign investors could also assist
domestic companies in modernizing their inventory and
operational strategies. For example, as part of a trade deal,
foreign investors could be required to provide a particular
number of outreach and/or education hours, during which time
these investors would provide instruction and guidance to more
provincial businesses.
There are already encouraging signs that trade capacity
building efforts by the U.S. and other nations have been wellreceived by CAFTA-DR nations. Currently, each CAFTA-DR
country has developed a “National Action Plan for Trade
Capacity Building,” in which it identifies particular areas where
outside assistance is needed to bolster trade and other aspects
of economic growth.253 A number of international institutions,
corporations, NGOs, as well as the U.S. government, provide
assistance to meet these needs.254 However, increasing the role
of Central American business leaders, who oversee locally the
creation of goods for trade on both a large and small scale, may
help improve the efficacy of these efforts and promote selfdetermination of national trade policies in these countries.
E. Improve Safeguards for Investors.
As CAFTA-DR is modernized, safeguards for investors
should be improved. Due to continued economic and political
instability in many Central American nations, many foreign
investors remain uneasy about investing in CAFTA-DR
countries. Further, arbitration is often cumbersome and slow,
leading investors to choose to invest in a more stable nation
where such a forum may be perceived as less likely to be needed.
Although CAFTA-DR allows for negotiations and consultations
253
OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES TRADE REP., CAFTA-DR TCB,
https://ustr.gov/issue-areas/trade-development/trade-capacity-building/caftadr-tcb (last visited Oct. 12, 2019).
254 Id.
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prior to seeking arbitration, such efforts should be reinforced. In
particular, a timeline for resolution of the dispute should be
imposed, and a timeline for expected relief or compensation
should be mandated.
Additionally, when arbitration tribunals are interpreting
“indirect expropriation” provisions, foreign investors should be
allowed to introduce the body of U.S. case law to assist in an
interpretation of whether indirect expropriation has occurred to
show that the investor’s reasonable interpretation of its rights
were derived from this standard.
Finally, increased emphasis should be placed upon
developing relationships between foreign investors and loans set
aside for economic and infrastructure development in large-scale
projects. For example, foreign investors may be able to increase
imports of natural resources or manufacturing goods relating to
a large-scale infrastructure project funded through
international development aid in instances where the CAFTADR nation does not have access to such resources domestically.
Such imports would be profitable (because the CAFTA-DR
country lacks a cost-effective substitute domestically) and would
promote social and economic goals within the CAFTA-DR
country, while simultaneously maintaining strong trade flows
between the U.S. and Central America.

CONCLUSION
In conclusion, CAFTA-DR changed Central American trade
by reducing trade barriers and by promoting regional
integration. Heightened attention to social, political, and
environmental issues, as well as new protections for
technological innovation, will help to further bolster CAFTADR’s ability to promote growth and improve living and working
conditions in Central America.
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